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I.
INTRODUCTION
Oliver Wendell Holmes, an early twentieth century jurist and
Chief Justice to the Supreme Court of the United States, once said,
“taxes are what we pay for civilized society.”1 This quote holds true
now, more than ever, as developed countries like the United States
(U.S.) and developing countries like Argentina are concerned with
the deleterious social effects of tax evasion and the enforcement of
tax compliance among their citizens and residents living or holding
accounts abroad.2 In order to achieve global taxation, key countries
and international organizations have pushed for more transparency
and less bank secrecy in international banking in hopes of smoking
out tax evaders.3 The key countries and international organizations,
which have primarily led the push for less bank secrecy and more
information sharing include the U.S., the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the European
Union (EU).4 The impetus for concern over tax evasion is the
amount of wealth, approximately $7.8 trillion, in accounts in foreign
financial institutions.5 Traditionally, secret bank accounts in Caribbean jurisdictions like the Cayman Islands or a Swiss bank account

1

Tax Quotes, IRS (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/taxquotes.
2
See Itai Grinberg, The Battle Over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L.
REV. 304, 306 (2012).
3
Michael S. Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad: Reconciling Principle and Practice, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 117, 141 (2014).
4
Grinberg, supra note 2, at 312 (explaining that the OECD started in 1960
as a membership of eighteen European countries as well as the U.S. and Canada);
See About the OECD: What We Do and How, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/about/whatwedoandhow/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2018) (noting
that now the OECD is a membership of thirty-five countries across the globe that
represent the world’s most advanced economies and several emerging economies,
such as Mexico, China, India, Brazil, and Turkey, and focused on securing economic growth and financial stability, the OECD monitors events in member countries and provides peer reviews in order to provide insight into legal and policy
corrective actions member states might take); About The EU: The EU in Brief,
EUR. UNION (Apr. 7, 2018), https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-inbrief_en. (noting that the EU is an economic and political union between twentyeight European countries established after the Second World War to promote economic trade and interdependence and the avoidance of conflict).
5
Grinberg, supra note 2, at 306.
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held in Switzerland are what come to mind when an “offshore account” is mentioned.6 In addition to residents of certain countries
hiding money earned domestically overseas in foreign offshore accounts, some countries such as the U.S. are also concerned with the
vast amount of expatriates living and working abroad generating income in other countries.7 Such expatriates are subject to taxation by
virtue of their American citizenship regardless of the jurisdiction in
which they reside.8 Consequently, for developed countries and international organizations dominated by the perspectives of developed countries, “taxation is the only practical means of raising the
revenue to finance government spending” on the social services they
provide.9 The United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and France each lose
about $100 billion in revenue each year from tax evasion, and the
U.S. loses $377 billion in revenue a year.10
The U.S. and the OECD developed the prevailing methods of
tax compliance and enforcement in the international tax system that
are currently in force: the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
(FATCA) and the Common Reporting Standard (CRS), respectively.11 FATCA requires tax authorities in other jurisdictions,
namely foreign financial institutions (FFIs), to obtain detailed information on financial accounts held by U.S. citizens and foreign entities with significant U.S. ownership and to report that information
6

CAB Concerned Over the Labeling of Fifteen Caribbean Countries as
“Tax Havens” in the State of Illinois’ HB3419, CARIB. ASS’N OF BANKS (May 5,
2017), http://cab-inc.com/cab-concerned-over-the-labelling-of-fifteen-caribbeancountries-as-tax-havens-in-the-state-of-illinois-hb3419/; see also Robert W.
Wood, Cayman Islands is The New Switzerland, But Not The Way You Think,
FORBES
(Apr.
18,
2014),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014/04/18/cayman-islands-is-the-new-switzerland-but-not-the-wayyou-think/#4dc3762d6fd9.
7
Kirsch, supra note 3, at 120.
8
Id. at 119.
9
Vito Tanzi & Howell Zee, Tax Policy for Developing Countries, IMF (Mar.
2001), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues/issues27/.
10
Charles S. Jr. Bowen, There Are Many Ways to Catch FATCAts: What Impact Will the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) Have on Caribbean
Nations’ Privacy Laws and Costs Associated with Non-Compliance, 1 INDON. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 968, 973-74 (2014).
11
See Andy Mukherjee, Private Bankers, You Have Worse Coming,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/201610-02/private-bankers-you-have-a-worse-year-coming-don-t-fight-it.
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back to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).12 The CRS, on the
other hand, is an extensive reporting standard broader in scope than
FATCA and is a mechanism for participating countries to share tax
information of residents globally.13 CRS is broader in terms of the
kind of financial information it seeks to collect, applies broadly to
residents of any given participating country and not solely to citizens, and applies to more categories of reporting entities than does
FATCA.14
Argentina is among the countries that have committed to both
the CRS and FATCA.15 As a developing country, Argentina has
much to gain from the automatic exchange of tax information
(AEOI) and the implementation of these standards, namely, the
identification of taxpayers and evaders and the collection of revenue
as around U.S. $400 billion are held by Argentines in offshore assets.16 Moreover, Argentina’s fiscal budget deficit during the first
half of 2017 was 1.5% of its gross domestic product, which translates to about U.S. $8.4 billion.17 However, as a developing country
with a past and present marked by ubiquitous government corruption and taxpayer distrust of keeping money within Argentina, the
automatic exchange of information poses serious concerns about the
12

Grinberg, supra note 2, at 334; see also What is FATCA? What is CRS?,
THOMSON REUTERS, https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/fatca-crs/what-is-crs-fatca/
(last visited Oct. 10, 2018).
13
Denise Hintzke & Andrea Garcia Castelao, The Common Reporting Standard: Impact on Financial Services Institutions, THE TAX ADVISOR (Mar. 1, 2016),
https://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2016/mar/crs-impact-on-financial-services-institutions.html.
14
Id.
15
See
CRS
by
Jurisdiction,
OECD
(Oct.
18,
2017),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/crs-implementation-and-assistance/crs-by-jurisdiction/; see also Argentina Signs Information-Sharing Agreement With the U.S., THE TAX TIMES (Dec. 28, 2016, 7:24 AM),
http://thetaxtimes.blogspot.com/2016/12/argentina-signs-information-sharing.html.
16
Lucia He, Understanding Argentina’s New “Mega” Tax Amnesty Law,
THE BUBBLE (July 11, 2016, 3:32 PM), http://www.thebubble.com/understanding-argentinas-new-mega-tax-amnesty-law/.
17
Argentina Posts Fiscal Deficit of 1.5 Percent of GDP in First Half,
REUTERS (July 19, 2017, 1:58 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-argentinafiscal/argentina-posts-fiscal-deficit-of-1-5-percent-of-gdp-in-first-halfidUSKBN1A423E.
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safety of confidential financial information.18 Long before the initial
release of CRS, the OECD recognized the potential for misuse that
access to such confidential information poses in the hands of corrupt
tax administrators and other government officials.19 The OECD’s
Keeping It Safe report acknowledges that some countries may not
have the technological or bureaucratic infrastructure for such enhanced tax administration, and also, certain countries worry about
the safety and security risks of automatically disclosing hundreds of
thousands of accounts to corrupt governments.20
The purpose of this article is to explore the current Argentine
effort to participate in the automatic exchange of information as it
relates to FATCA and the CRS, and its efforts to overcome current
corruption, while protecting the confidentiality of taxpayer information. In particular, this paper will pay attention to the impact corruption may have on effective tax administration and guidance for
safeguarding the privacy and confidentiality of taxpayer information. Part II of this article will discuss historical events that led to
global concern with bank secrecy and tax evasion, how various
agreements operate under FATCA and CRS, and Argentina’s agreements to address tax evasion. Part III of this article will discuss relevant instances of corruption in Argentina, the impact of corruption
on tax administration, and the status of Argentina’s efforts to address corruption. Part IV will discuss data confidentiality guidance
from the OECD’s Keeping It Safe report and the IRS International
Data Exchange Service (IDES) system, and explore the capacity for
data privacy in tax administration in Argentina. Lastly, Part V will
analyze Argentina’s ability to comply with the level of tax administration required under FATCA and CRS, and future implications
18

Cf. Patricia Rey Mallen, Mexico and Argentina Are the Most Corrupt
Countries in Latin America, Survey Reveals, INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 10, 2013,
3:02 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/mexico-argentina-are-most-corrupt-countries-latin-america-survey-reveals-1340779 (discussing levels of corruption in
Argentina’s public sector; therefore, there may be a connection between corruption and accountable tax administration that keeps financial information confidential).
19
See generally Keeping It Safe: The OECD Guide on the Protection of Confidentiality of Information Exchanged for Tax Purposes, OECD (July 23, 2012),
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/keeping-it-safe-report.pdf
[hereinafter Keeping It Safe].
20
Id.
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that the international trend toward transparency may have on Argentina.
II.

BANK SECRECY AND TAX EVASION

A. Cracking the Vault: Tax Evasion Scandals and Commitments
to End Bank Secrecy
In 2008, major offshore tax evasion scandals gained international publicity and negatively impacted some of the oldest banking
institutions in Europe.21 Namely, the United Bank of Switzerland
(UBS), one of Europe’s largest banks, aided in tax evasion.22 Wegelin & Co., Switzerland’s oldest bank at 270 years old, also aided
in tax evasion.23 Moreover, the Liechtenstein Global Trust (LGT)
bank of the royal family of Liechtenstein implicated itself in a tax
evasion scandal.24
In response to disclosures of banks facilitating tax evasion, the
U.S. indicted a UBS private banker, Bradley Birkenfeld, who “pled
guilty to conspiracy to defraud the U.S. government based on his
actions in helping wealthy U.S. citizens (living in the United States)
conceal millions of dollars of income in UBS accounts.”25 Birkenfeld’s subsequent cooperation as a whistleblower with the U.S. government exposed actions taken by UBS to help its American clients
evade taxes.26 Birkenfeld’s disclosures were highly instrumental in
the Justice Department’s further investigations and UBS’s admission of guilt on charges of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. government.27
In exchange for this admission, UBS entered a deferred prosecution agreement pursuant to which UBS worked with the U.S. and
Swiss governments to provide the IRS with thousands of accounts
held by U.S. taxpayers.28 News of UBS’s investigation prompted
Wegelin to spontaneously disclose undeclared accounts it held for
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Grinberg, supra note 2, at 306.
Grinberg, supra note 2, at 306.
Kirsch, supra note 3, at 143.
Grinberg, supra note 2, at 306.
Kirsch, supra note 3, at 142.
Kirsch, supra note 3, at 142.
Kirsch, supra note 3, at 142.
Kirsch, supra note 3, at 142.
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U.S. taxpayers.29 Eventually, Wegelin pled guilty to facilitating tax
evasion and shut down after agreeing to pay “$74 million in restitution, fines, and forfeitures” to the U.S. government.30 U.S. enforcement actions against tax evaders and offshore financial institutions
facilitating tax evasion only increased following these scandals.31
Internationally, leaders of the G20 countries also committed to increasing transparency and exposing offshore tax evasion as the financial crisis of 2008 magnified fiscal and budgetary problems.32
The Panama Papers leak in 2015 can be considered a recent indicator of where the world is on ending bank secrecy. Over eleven
million files and 2.6 terabytes of information were leaked from the
database of Mossack Fonseca, a leading Panamanian firm, revealing
the use of offshore accounts by the wealthy around the world, including some 143 politicians and 12 national leaders and their families or inner circle associates.33 Mossack Fonseca is the world’s
fourth largest firm providing global offshore financial services in
over 40 countries, but it mostly operates in countries considered as
tax havens, such as Switzerland, Cyprus, the British Virgin Islands,
and the British dependencies.34 Additionally, it has serviced over
300,000 international companies.35 Regardless of whether Mossack
Fonseca’s offshore services have been used for tax evasion or legitimate reasons, the use of confidential “tax havens” for the favorable
tax treatment of investments is still popular.
29

Kirsch, supra note 3, at 143.
Kirsch, supra note 3, at 143.
31
Kirsch, supra note 3, at 146 (discussing that the U.S. has worked to combat
bank secrecy since the enactment of the Bank Secrecy Act in 1970, which gave
rise to the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) treasury
form); Id. (noting that FBAR requires U.S. taxpayers holding foreign bank and
financial accounts to report their aggregate balance in foreign accounts that exceed $10,000 at any time during the calendar year, and compliance with FBAR
was traditionally low so Congress increased penalty amounts that are assessed for
each year of noncompliance).
32
Grinberg, supra note 2, at 309 (noting that the G20 member states include
the U.S., U.K., E.U., and many other states including Argentina, Brazil, Canada,
and China).
33
Luke Harding, What Are The Panama Papers? A Guide to History’s Biggest Data Leak, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2016, 5:42 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/03/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-panama-papers.
34
Id.
35
Id.
30
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B.

A Comparative View of FATCA and CRS
In 2010, Congress enacted FATCA as sections 1471 to 1474 of
the Internal Revenue Code.36 It requires tax authorities in other jurisdictions, namely FFIs, to obtain detailed information on financial
accounts held by U.S. citizens and foreign entities with significant
U.S. ownership and to report that information back to the IRS.37 The
particular financial information FATCA seeks to capture is the value
of each account, the value of investment income, and the “gross proceeds from the sale of property credited to a U.S. account.”38 To
ensure compliance by FFIs and Non-Financial Foreign Entities
(NFFEs) that are implicated by the statute, FATCA contains a withholding tax provision, otherwise known as a penalty.39 Because FFIs
may hold U.S. investments or receive U.S. sourced income, payments, or sales proceeds, amounts are withheld by imposing a 30%
tax on all U.S. sourced income that these FFIs may receive if they
do not comply with FATCA’s reporting and disclosure rules.40 Ultimately, Congress enacted FATCA to “force foreign financial institutions to disclose their U.S. account holders or pay a steep penalty
for nondisclosure.”41
While FATCA’s expectations are primarily unilateral in that it
demands that information be reported to the IRS without reciprocity,
the OECD envisioned a multilateral mechanism for sharing tax information of residents globally.42 The OECD released the first version of the Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account
Information in Tax Matters in 2014, which contained the CRS and
model “competent authority” agreements (MCAAs) which could be
36

Grinberg, supra note 2, at 334.
Grinberg, supra note 2, at 335; see also What is FATCA? What is CRS?,
supra note 12.
38
Grinberg, supra note 2, at 334.
39
What is FATCA? What is CRS?, supra note 12.
40
Ikins D. Clarke, U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA):
FATCA And The Banking Sector, DELOITTE (Oct. 31, 2012), https://www.caribexport.com/login/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/FATCA-and-the-BankingSector-Ikins-Clarke.pdf.
41
Grinberg, supra note 2, at 334.
42
See Kirsch, supra note 3, at 119 (noting that the U.S. uses either citizenship
or residence as a basis to assert jurisdiction for taxation over an individual, while
the overwhelming majority of other countries use residence as a basis to assert tax
jurisdiction).
37
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entered into on a bilateral, multilateral, or nonreciprocal basis by
participating countries.43 More specifically, the CRS is an extensive
reporting standard, broader in scope than FATCA, and provides
rules on documentation and due diligence applicable to financial institutions.44 In scope, CRS is broader in terms of the kind of financial
information it seeks to collect, applies broadly to residents of any
given participating country and not solely citizens, and applies to
more categories of reporting entities than does FATCA.45 As of December 2015, over 95 jurisdictions committed to the CRS, excluding
the U.S.46
C.

Agreements Under FATCA and Argentina’s Commitment
The U.S. has facilitated the implementation of FATCA through
the use of bilateral Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs).47 IGAs
are not tax treaties, but rather are negotiated agreements with partner
jurisdictions that are treated as “in effect” or “in force” by the IRS
and the partner jurisdiction.48 IGAs are meant to overcome restrictions or conflict with local laws in partner jurisdictions.49 FFIs
in these partner jurisdictions that have agreed to an IGA can choose
to follow the IGA agreement in effect, or an FFI can choose not to
follow the IGA.50 The IRS considers FFIs that do not follow IGAs
to be nonparticipating financial institutions subject to a withholding
penalty.51 There are two model IGAs that jurisdictions can have with
the U.S., either the Model 1 IGA, providing for the reciprocal ex-

43

Hintzke & Castelao, supra note 13.
Hintzke & Castelao, supra note 13. (noting that CRS is based extensively
on FATCA Model 1 Intergovernmental Agreements (Model 1 IGA)).
45
Hintzke & Castelao, supra note 13.
46
Hintzke & Castelao, supra note 13.
47
ERIKA K. LUNDER & CAROL A. PETTIT, CONG. RES. SERV., R43444,
REPORTING FOREIGN FINANCIAL ASSETS UNDER TITLES 26 AND 31: FATCA AND
FBAR 1, 8 (2014) [hereinafter FATCA and FBAR].
48
U.S. IRS is Focusing on FATCA Intergovernmental Agreements Currently
“In Effect”, ERNST & YOUNG (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.ey.com/gl/en/services/tax/international-tax/alert--us-irs-is-focusing-on-fatca-intergovernmentalagreements-currently--in-effect-.
49
Id.
50
FATCA and FBAR, supra note 47, at 8‒9.
51
FATCA and FBAR, supra note 47, at 8‒9.
44
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change of information, or the Model 2 IGA with no reciprocal exchange provision.52 Depending on whether the jurisdiction already
has a tax treaty or tax information exchange agreement (TIEA) with
the U.S., the IGA may derive authority from the legal framework
already in place between the two governments.53 Furthermore, pursuant to Model 1 IGAs, FFIs report to their jurisdiction’s tax authority or administration, and then the tax authority reports the information on an annual basis to the IRS.54 Conversely, pursuant to
Model 2 IGAs where there is no treaty or agreement with the jurisdiction, FFIs report, pursuant to an FFI agreement and with the consent of the account holder, directly to the IRS.55 If an FFI does not
have the consent of the account holder, then the FFI reports account
information in the aggregate directly to the IRS, giving the IRS the
option to request information about that group from the jurisdiction.56 As of 2016, 83 IGAs have been signed but only 61 are considered in force.57
Currently, Argentina has signed a TIEA with the U.S., and the
two governments are negotiating a more comprehensive tax treaty.58
The U.S.’s desire for countries to enter into IGAs has largely expedited the negotiations it has had with Argentina in the past.59 The
U.S. had desired a bilateral tax treaty with Argentina to negotiate
double taxation provisions as they pertain to multinational companies; whereas, Argentina preferred a TIEA to maintain some of its
taxing rights over multinational companies with connections to the
U.S.60
Increased collaboration between the U.S. and Argentina benefits
both countries: the TIEA benefits the U.S. by inducing Argentina to
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

FATCA and FBAR, supra note 47, at 8‒9.
FATCA and FBAR, supra note 47, at 8‒9.
FATCA and FBAR, supra note 47, at 8‒9.
FATCA and FBAR, supra note 47, at 8‒9.
FATCA and FBAR, supra note 47, at 8‒9.
FATCA and FBAR, supra note 47, at 8‒9.
Argentina Signs Information-Sharing Agreement With the U.S., supra note

15.
59

See Martin Hearson, Why the U.S. and Argentina Have No Tax Information
Exchange Agreement, WORDPRESS (Sept. 5, 2013), https://martinhearson.wordpress.com/2013/09/05/why-the-us-and-argentina-have-no-tax-information-exchange-agreement/.
60
Id.

2019]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

133

sign an IGA to comply with FATCA, and it benefits Argentina,
which suffered economically prior to the current Macri administration.61 The agreement will enable Argentina to identify undeclared
taxpayer accounts in the U.S. and lends credibility to the Macri administration’s governance. Argentina has also implemented its own
tax amnesty plan to induce voluntary compliance among its taxpayers.62
D. Multilateral Competent Authority Agreements (MCAA)
Under CRS and Argentina’s Commitment
CRS is very broad because it capitalizes off of existing frameworks for the automatic exchange of tax information developed already between countries, by the OECD and the E.U., such as frameworks like Article 6 of the Multilateral Convention, extant bilateral
tax treaties or TIEAs, and the E.U. Directive.63 As a result, CRS is
readily translated into domestic law, increasing the chance of successful implementation of CRS and MCAA’s due diligence requirements to identify reportable accounts in a jurisdiction.64 Moreover,
CRS requires jurisdictions to report intended exchange partners,
confirm that domestic CRS legislation is in place, report whether the
basis of its exchange is reciprocal or nonreciprocal, report data
transmission and encryption methods to be used, report data protection requirements not yet achieved, and confirm that domestic data
privacy and confidentiality safeguards are in line with CRS.65 While
CRS is already extensive, each jurisdiction that participates in CRS
can choose to structure its domestic law to capture more information

61

Argentina Signs Information-Sharing Agreement With the U.S., supra note

15.
62

Argentina Signs Information-Sharing Agreement With the U.S., supra note

15.
63

International
Framework
For
The
CRS,
OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/international-framework-for-thecrs/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2018) (noting that the Multilateral Convention is also
known as the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters).
64
Id.
65
Id.
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and increase efficiency within their automatic exchange of information framework.66
Currently, Argentina has indicated its intent to comply with CRS
and begin reporting by the beginning of 2017.67Argentina has shown
support for information sharing and tax transparency since 2012,
when it became the first country in South America to become a party
to the OECD’s Multilateral Convention.68 Joining the Multilateral
Convention gave Argentina additional tools for international tax cooperation and administrative assistance in tax matters.69
III.

CORRUPTION IN ARGENTINA

A.

A History of Economic Boom and Decline
In the earlier part of the 20th century, Argentina’s economic
growth and urbanization outpaced other countries in Latin America.70 Argentina experienced a golden age, prior to World War I,
where its gross domestic product (GDP) steadily grew by 6% annually due to its agriculture and cattle industries, and the country experienced a large wave of immigration from Europe.71 Argentina
was even ranked as one of the ten richest countries in the world at
that time in league with the U.S., Great Britain, and other western
countries, such as France.72 By the 1930s, many Argentine cities
were urbanized while other countries in Latin America remained
predominantly rural.73 That legacy is evident today in metropolitan
66

Argentina: GATCA And CRS Compliance (OECD), GOLDING & GOLDING,
https://www.goldinglawyers.com/argentina-gatca-and-crs-compliance-oecd-international-tax-lawyers/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2018).
67
Id.
68
Argentina Becomes the First South American Country to Become a Party
to
the
Multilateral
Convention,
OECD
(Sept.
13,
2012),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/taxargentinabecomesthefirstsouthamericancountrytobecomeapartytothemultilateralconvention.htm.
69
Id.
70
ELISA MUZZINI ET AL., LEVERAGING THE POTENTIAL OF ARGENTINE
CITIES: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY ACTION 7 (World Bank Group eds., 2017).
71
The Tragedy of Argentina: A Century of Decline, THE ECONOMIST (Feb.
17, 2014), https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21596582-one-hundredyears-ago-argentina-was-future-what-went-wrong-century-decline.
72
Id.
73
MUZZINI ET AL., supra note 70, at 7.
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Buenos Aires alone, which accounts for almost 50% of Argentina’s
gross domestic product (GDP) and a little less than 40% of the country’s urban population.74
Although Argentina may have outpaced other countries in the
region in the early 20th century, its economic growth has been
dampened by political unrest and cycles of financial crises starting
with a military coup in 1930.75 Additional military coups followed
in 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966, and 1976.76 Argentina’s history of military dictatorship ended in 1989 when it held popular elections for
the first time in decades.77 As Argentina experienced constant political change, it also experienced instability in its economy, even during the period when democracy had been restored.78 Argentina experienced repeated recessions throughout the 1970s and the 1980s,
and during the two-year period between 1989 and 1990, hyperinflation further destabilized the economy.79 Inflation rose over 2,000%
and peaked at 20,000%.80
Then in 1998, Argentina experienced a deep recession and catastrophic financial crisis that lasted until 2002.81 The government’s
fiscal policies at that time, including extensive foreign borrowing,
contributed to further devaluation and distrust of the peso and eventually led to a run on the banks in November 2001.82 The government took austerity measures, such as freezing bank deposits and
access to savings accounts to prevent accountholders from converting Argentine pesos into U.S. dollars under the existing Convertibility Plan, which had provided that pesos could be exchanged on a
1:1 basis with the U.S. dollar.83 Unable to convert pesos into dollars,

74

MUZZINI ET AL., supra note 70, at 7.
The Tragedy of Argentina: A Century of Decline, supra note 71.
76
The Tragedy of Argentina: A Century of Decline, supra note 71.
77
The Tragedy of Argentina: A Century of Decline, supra note 71.
78
The Tragedy of Argentina: A Century of Decline, supra note 71.
79
The Tragedy of Argentina: A Century of Decline, supra note 71.
80
The Tragedy of Argentina: A Century of Decline, supra note 71.
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Argentines could not protect against losing their savings to high inflation.84 Civil unrest ensued in December 2001 as Argentines
demonstrated against these fiscal measures.85
A few days later, after the government froze personal bank accounts, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced it could
no longer loan money to Argentina because Argentina repeatedly
failed to meet the conditions of its September 2001 rescue program.86 The IMF had given Argentina over US $20 billion in support
between 2000 and 2001.87 Without international financial support
from the IMF, Argentina effectively lost access to international financial markets and defaulted on its US $93 billion sovereign debt.88
Due to this financial crisis, the Argentine economy suffered between
2001 and 2002: the economy contracted by 11%; unemployment
rose to 22.5%; and 57.5% of Argentines were considered as living
below the national poverty line.89 The austere fiscal measures taken,
like the Law of Public Emergency and Reform of the Exchange Rate
Regime which unpegged the peso from the U.S. dollar, and negotiations to restructure its debt, slowly brought Argentina out of its financial crisis by the end of 2002.90 However, it took until 2010 to
restructure over 90% of Argentina’s defaulted debt.91 Moreover,
lasting damage to the value of the peso and the Argentine banking
sector further cemented public distrust of Argentine currency and
Argentine institutions.92
B.

Popular Distrust and Ubiquitous Corruption
The lack of confidence and distrust in Argentina’s political and
financial institutions could not be more evident in the illegal exchange market known as a cueva, or “cave,” used by Argentines who
favor holding onto U.S. dollars, rather than pesos.93 Cuevas thrived
between 2010 and 2015 when Argentina had an official exchange
84
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rate that made it unfavorable for Argentines to exchange their pesos
for dollars.94 Argentines and travelers preferred the going market
exchange rate because it offered more pesos per dollar than the official exchange rate.95 This situation led to the black market for
dólar blue, or “blue dollar,” and cueva storefronts to complete the
black market transactions.96 Although the Argentine government addressed this problem in December 2015 by getting rid of the official
exchange rate in favor of the floating market exchange rate, the
black market for dollars still exists.97 Argentines are mainly trying
to hedge against the uncertainty of inflation which affects the affordability of a basic food basket: “Imagine a dollar burning a hole in
your pocket because you don’t know if it will be worth 60 or 30
cents in a few months.”98
It may not be surprising that Argentina’s history of political turmoil, economic instability, and distrust of the peso and legitimate
banking institutions have contributed to Argentina’s standing as a
corrupt nation.99 According to a 2013 global corruption survey by
Transparency International, an international nongovernmental organization (NGO), Argentines believe, on average, that political
parties, public officials, civil servants, police, the judiciary, and the
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legislature are more corrupt than the business sector.100 Additionally, 72% of Argentines believed that their country’s corruption had
increased between 2013 and 2014.101
Whereas abuse of police power was considered the most rampant in countries like Mexico, Venezuela, Bolivia, and El Salvador,
political corruption was considered the most rampant by residents in
Argentina, similar to the public opinion of residents in Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay about political corruption.102 In 2000, Harvard
University and the World Economic Forum did a Global Competitiveness Report of 4,022 firms in 59 countries, and Argentina also
scored poorly then: 54th in the independence of the judiciary; 45th
for corruption in the legal system; 40th for irregular payments to
government officials; and 54th in the reliability of police protection.103
Political corruption in Argentina has even extended to the office
of the president. For example, in the 1990s, former President Carlos
Menem was known for packing a Supreme Court with his political
supporters even though he did not align with them politically.104 After his presidency, Menem was arrested and charged with an illegal
arms-shipment deal.105 In 2016, former President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was charged with corruption during her time in office from 2007 to 2015.106 Fernández de Kirchner was indicted for
directing government contracts for public road works to a company
called Austral Constructions.107 Fernández de Kirchner’s former
100
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Minister of Planning, Julio De Vido, and her former Secretary of
Public Works, José Lopez were also charged.108 Fernández de
Kirchner was also separately indicted for interfering with the sale of
U.S. dollars by Argentina’s central bank by selling U.S. $17 billion
in futures contracts at 10.65 pesos to the dollar, which was much
lower than the true value of the peso per dollar in the futures market
at that time.109 She was indicted along with her former Finance Minister and the former Central Bank Chief.110 Lastly, Fernández de
Kirchner was indicted for allegedly receiving kickbacks from another construction company to which she may have directed government contracts.111
The election of the current president, Mauricio Macri, a probusiness and fiscal conservative, is considered a shift away from the
liberal policies of Fernández de Kirchner and her deceased husband
who preceded her as president.112 Whereas Fernández de Kirchner’s
policies focused on extensive social spending to help poor families,
human rights issues, and economic policies that were considered
anti-business, Macri’s administration promises to de-regulate the
economy and allow the market to prevail in order to address the
stagnant economy and reduce inflation.113 A 2017 Multi-Dimensional Economic Survey of Argentina by the OECD shows that there
are currently higher barriers to entrepreneurship and competition in
Argentina than Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Brazil, and, on average,
Latin America in its entirety.114
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C.

The Nexus Between Corruption and Tax Administration
Corruption can be defined as the “pecuniary or nonpecuniary
considerations given to government officials for the use of public
office for private gains.”115 Corruption can further be classified into
five general categories: political, administrative, grand corruption,
petty corruption, and patronage or paternalism.116 For example,
when corruption is systemic and political, it can affect the design
and implementation stages of government policies and even skew
regulatory decisions.117 On the other hand, corruption can be localized or petty on the bureaucratic level and involve activities such as
bribery or interference with the routine allocation of zoning rights
and licenses.118 Other common examples of corruption are government construction projects and how such contracts are awarded or
renegotiated.119 Generally, corruption may initiate either on the supply side, where a bribe is offered, or the demand side, where a bribe
is requested.120
While Latin America includes emerging markets that have experienced improvements in corruption, most improvements are
small.121 For example, corruption in Honduras has improved with
efforts to control corruption in critical institutions, such as the police
force, the social security administration, and the tax administration.122 Nevertheless, corruption in Honduras remains above the average of normalized corruption in Latin America.123 Like Honduras,
Argentina’s level of corruption also remains above the average of
normalized corruption in the region.124
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Because endemic corruption has been known to affect the state’s
ability to perform its core functions, it may also negatively affect tax
administration.125 Several variables that contribute to corruption in
tax administration include: (1) the complexity of tax laws, (2) the
monopoly power and degree of discretion of tax officials, (3) the
lack of adequate monitoring and supervision, (4) political leadership, (5) the unwillingness of taxpayers to pay taxes, and (6) the environment in the public sector.126 With regard to the complexity of
tax laws, as a system becomes more complex, taxpayers are less
likely to be aware of their rights and procedural rules applicable to
them, giving tax officers more discretion in their treatment of taxpayers.127 This dynamic may increase the risk of exploitation of taxpayers by tax officials.128 With regard to the monopoly power and
discretion of tax officials, the tax officers operating within their assigned regions or geographical area represent the tax department,
and the monopoly power this gives a tax official increases the potential for corruption by both the taxpayer and the tax officer.129
However, it is important to note that the complexity of tax laws and
procedures in itself does not always lead to corruption, but rather is
closely connected to another variable, the overall environment in the
public sector.130 The level of corruption in the administrative environment of the government as a whole will influence the level of
corruption in that government’s tax administration.131
Socialist systems offer greater opportunities for corruption than
do liberal economic systems because of the greater administrative
controls over the economy that give bureaucrats greater discretion
in economic planning and implementation.132 The complexity of tax
laws, the overall environment of corruption in government, and the
power of bureaucrats within a heavily regulated economy are
closely intertwined and all often lead to a lack of monitoring and
supervision.133 Without adequate supervision, accountability, and
125
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enforcement measures to maintain integrity, public workers are
more likely to shirk their public duties.134 Political leadership may
also insulate corrupt practices, and when this happens, the spread of
corruption at lower levels is likely.135 From macro-level fiscal incentives to foreign trade taxes, high-level officials and politicians
are more likely to be involved and also implicate lower-level officials who share in the gains from the illegal activity.136
As aforementioned, Argentina has high levels of corruption at
the political level, and almost two-thirds of Argentines believe that
the political leadership, the legislature, and the judiciary are corrupt.137 Coupled with a popular distrust of the peso, the formal banking institutions, and the black market for dollars, it can be inferred
that Argentina’s level of corruption even affects its tax administration.138 Another variable, when determining corruption in tax administration, is the unwillingness of taxpayers to pay taxes.139 The
unwillingness to pay taxes is particularly common in middle-income
countries, such as India.140 Taxpayers who are extremely unwilling
to pay taxes or comply with the law are more likely to proactively
offer bribes to tax officials in order to not pay taxes at all or reduce
their tax liability.141 Like India, Argentina experiences high tax evasion; as of 2016, Argentines have held between $200 billion and
$400 billion in assets in offshore accounts in countries like Switzerland, the United States, and Uruguay.142 During the presidency of
Fernández de Kirchner, Argentines hid their wealth offshore because of the extremely high inflation and unreliable economic data
published by the administration.143

134

Purohit, supra note 115, at 287.
Purohit, supra note 115, at 287.
136
Purohit, supra note 115, at 287‒88.
137
Mallen, supra note 18.
138
See The Tragedy of Argentina: A Century of Decline, supra note 71.
139
Purohit, supra note 115, at 287.
140
Purohit, supra note 115, at 287.
141
Purohit, supra note 115, at 287.
142
Patrick Gillespie, Argentina rakes in cash from new tax law, CNN MONEY
(Dec. 28, 2016), https://money.cnn.com/2016/12/28/news/economy/argentinatax-amnesty/index.html.
143
Id.
135

2019]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

143

D. The Status of Argentina’s Domestic and International Efforts
to Address the Economy and Corruption
Current domestic policy in Argentina may have the effect of
lowering corruption while improving the economy. One of President
Macri’s goals for his administration after taking office in December
2015 was to address Argentina’s economic problems, including high
inflation and tax evasion.144 With Macri’s support, the Argentine
Senate approved a tax amnesty law in 2016.145 The tax amnesty law
is entitled Ley de Sinceramiento Fiscal y Reparación Histórica a los
Jubilados (the Fiscal Honesty and Historic Reparation to Pensioners
Law), and is nicknamed ley de blanqueos.146 The ley de blanqueos
is a multipurpose bill designed to incentivize compliance with Argentine tax law, bring back billions of dollars into the formal and
legitimate economy, and restore the pecuniary interests of unpaid
pensioners.147
First, the ley de blanqueos allows Argentines to register undeclared income and assets without questioning their origins and removes the threat of prosecution for tax evasion.148 Individuals and
companies can declare their assets in three ways: paying a zero, five,
or ten percent tax rate on declared assets depending on the total
amount declared; purchase non-transferable Argentine Treasury
bonds; or “invest in the economy through a Common Fund for longterm investments” in public works.149 If assets are not declared, then
individuals or companies risk prosecution for tax evasion.150 The ley
de blanqueos excludes all members of the Executive, Legislative,
and Judicial branches, and their immediate family, from participating in the tax amnesty program because of opposition party concerns
that the law would benefit government officials who evade taxes.151
The government expects US $20 billion to come into the country
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through the ley de blanqueos because of tax revenues, assets voluntarily brought back from overseas, and its investment schemes.152
The Macri administration also expects the CRS and Argentina’s
multinational agreements on the exchange of information to make it
easier to detect taxpayers hiding money abroad.153
Second, the ley de blanqueos will allow for new money to be
used as reparations to pensioners and retirees who never received
their pension payment, or a small fraction of their payments, over
the past twenty years due to government fraud.154
As the ley de blanqueos strengthens the integrity of the Argentine government through policies that promote Argentines participating legitimately in the formal economy, it may have the desired
effect of lowering levels of corruption in Argentine government and
society. Within five to six months of the enactment of the ley de
blanqueos, Argentines declared US $90 billion,155 beating both the
government’s modest estimates and the $2.6 billion declared under
tax amnesty during the Fernández de Kirchner administration.156
However, despite the initial success of the ley de blanqueos, the
OECD’s 2017 economic survey of Argentina found several key obstacles still affecting Argentina: (1) the rule of law is still weak and
corruption hinders the investment climate; (2) the central bank lacks
a level of independence which reduces the effectiveness of monetary
policy; (3) the tax system is complex, fails to reduce inequalities,
and encourages people to turn to the informal economy; (4) few people pay income taxes; and (5) multi-year deficit targets by the executive branch are not mirrored in legislation and rules.157 The OECD
expresses hope in the pro-market economic reforms that President
Macri’s administration has made and provides recommendations on
domestic policy that will help Argentina to raise the material living
standard, bolster the social safety net, and close the high income152
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inequality gap that leaves one-third of all Argentines in poverty.158
With respect to corruption, the OECD recommends that Argentina
strengthen the independence of entities that investigate corruption,
reorganize the judiciary, and enact the Corporate Liability Bill to
provide for the prosecution of corporate bribery.159
Aside from domestic policy, Argentina has made international
commitments to lower corruption. As of March 24, 2017, Argentina
has been part of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention for the past
sixteen years.160 While Argentina has made efforts to implement the
Convention on Combating Bribery since December 2015, the
OECD Working Group on Bribery found that Argentina still remains in serious non-compliance.161 Regarding recommendations
from its Phase 3 evaluation, Argentina has only fully implemented
Recommendations 8, 11(a), and 12(a), and partially implemented
4(e), 5(a), 5(d), 5(f), 6(a), 6(b), 9(c), 9(d), 10(c), 10(d), 10(f), 11(b),
12(b), and 13(a).162 About 24 other recommendations remain outstanding.163 Of these recommendations, 11(a) is a tax-related measure that would disallow the tax deductibility of bribes to foreign
public officials, 11(b) would increase training for tax examiners and
official tax administrators on detecting bribery, and 11(c) calls for
amending legislation to allow tax information to be shared with foreign authorities for use in bribery investigations.164 Moreover, the
OECD is concerned that Argentina has not enacted the Corporate
Liability Bill introduced into Congress in 2016, which would hold
companies and citizens liable for foreign bribery.165 Also, the Criminal Procedure Code of 2014 has not been entered into force, which
158
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would aid in the speedy investigation and prosecution of complex
economic crimes.166 Lastly, Argentina has not introduced legislation
to protect whistleblowers.167
IV.

DATA CONFIDENTIALITY

A. Fears that Less Bank Secrecy Could Threaten the Personal
Safety of the Taxpayers
Before the automatic and voluntary exchange of tax information
became as popular as it is today, some jurisdictions feared the negative consequences of sharing sensitive taxpayer information with
developing countries.168 These jurisdictions were primarily considered tax havens, which favored bank secrecy.169 The general problem was that these jurisdictions lacked confidence in the tax administrations of developing countries to safeguard confidential financial
information, and they feared that leaks inside the domestic tax system would be likely, leading to formal and informal harassment of
people or companies.170 Wealthy taxpayers primarily feared that
leakage of their financial information could lead to “extortion, confiscation of their wealth, overtaxing, kidnapping, erosion of their
civil liberties,” and other forms of harassment.171 For example, some
taxpayers even feared that the exchange of tax information could
compromise the privacy and safety of certain marginalized groups
in the Middle East, such as gay individuals in Saudi Arabia or Jews
in other jurisdictions.172 Moreover, for wealthy taxpayers in Latin
America, the growth of gang violence and organized crime presents
an ongoing threat to their personal security.173
While these potential fears about the exchange of tax information may be well grounded, there are competing perspectives on
166
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the likelihood of taxpayer information being used for other illicit
purposes. For example, the perspective of Nicholas Shaxson and the
Tax Justice Network, a self-described pro-globalization activist
think tank,174 is that these fears are unfounded. Shaxson argues that
a secret bank account will not protect a Latin American landowner
or South East Asian executive from kidnapping or extortion because
criminals or gangs act without needing to know about secret wealth
holdings.175 Primarily, criminals act based on knowledge of one’s
domestic and visible wealth or holdings.176 And rich families who
fear kidnapping and extortion will have already procured security or
moved because they can afford it.177 Shaxson further argues that
wealth confiscation is a weak argument because the exchange of tax
information does not mean that wealth and investments have to be
returned into the country.178 Rather, it means that gross income is
known so that the appropriate tax can be assessed.179
On the other hand, the Center for Freedom and Prosperity shares
a completely opposite view. The Center is a non-profit organization
that advances international market liberalization, financial privacy,
and the fiscal sovereignty of jurisdictions to preserve jurisdictional
tax competition.180 According to the Center, FATCA and the CRS
will substantially threaten the financial privacy of taxpayers and
lead to abuse, giving credibility to the fears mentioned above.181 The
concern for abuse stems from the Center’s view that it is imprudent
to share sensitive financial information about American citizens or
corporations with countries that “do not respect Western privacy
norms, have systematic problems with corruption or are antagonistic
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to the United States.”182 The Center says that countries such as Colombia, China, and Russia present this problem.183
Although the U.S. Treasury Department and the IRS review the
data privacy legal framework of the foreign jurisdiction before entering into an information exchange agreement under FATCA, it
does not dissuade foreign tax administrators from having other motives.184 The Center says this is because the underlying institutional
interest of tax agencies is the collection of tax revenue, and there is
little incentive to think beyond that interest.185 Additionally, tax administrators in corrupt governments with access to the personal financial information of American expatriates may use the information for criminal purposes like committing identity theft, identifying potential kidnapping victims, identifying the resources of potential political opponents or dissenters, or committing industrial espionage.186
A third perspective lying outside, the binary debate between tax
transparency versus data protection may be evidenced in the actual
experience of tax administration in developing countries, such as
Mexico. At one point in time, taxpayers were able to pay taxes with
in-kind contributions or even pay taxes anonymously.187 For example, the art-for-taxes program, which was created in 1957, allowed
noncompliant taxpayers who owed back taxes to pay off tax debt
with paintings, sculptures, and other art instead of cash.188 Based on
Aztec and Mayan traditions of paying tax debt with in-kind goods
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or services, the art-for-taxes program has had the effect of promoting art and giving Mexico a rich art collection of museum quality
works displayed in museums throughout the country.189
With respect to the anonymous payment of taxes, under the
Third Article of the Tax Decree of January 26, 2005, tax residents
in Mexico with foreign source income may elect to pay income taxes
on an anonymous basis.190 The resident taxpayer will receive payment verification to keep in their records in the event of a future
audit, but their identity remains undisclosed.191 These alternate
methods of tax collection in Mexico show that despite its high levels
of corruption and kidnappings,192 plenty of taxpayers, even those
with money offshore, are not evading taxation and may pay taxes
without disclosure.
Overall, arguments against the exchange of tax information may
hold some weight, but the general consensus after the economic crisis of 2008 and 2009 was that ensuring tax compliance promotes
better governance.193 An argument for the exchange of tax information was that because political leaders in developing countries
were likely to either falsify domestic tax returns or use offshore bank
accounts to safeguard their wealth against inflation or evade taxes,
equal treatment of rich and poor taxpayers would cause domestic tax
systems to improve.194 The impetus for improvement would come
from the elites, subject to equal treatment, who are influential
enough to advocate for better governance and accountability.195
Generally, the OECD has led the consensus that transparency
and the effective exchange of information would lead to improved
governance and that tax havens which facilitate tax avoidance and
criminal activity like money laundering and embezzlement destabilize the global economy.196 To this end, the OECD has published
189
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comprehensive guidance in the aforementioned Keeping It Safe report for jurisdictions desiring to share information, while improving
their governance and taxpayer confidence in the integrity of domestic tax administration.
B. OECD and American Guidance on Data Confidentiality in
Tax Administration
In 2012, the OECD published Keeping It Safe as guidance to
jurisdictions on protecting the confidentiality of tax information exchanged under various exchange of information agreements and
treaties.197 Anticipating the growth of tax information exchange
globally, the OECD’s report underscores the importance of taxpayer
confidence in the confidentiality of their information exchanged under such agreements and treaties.198 Therefore, keeping tax information confidential requires not only a legal framework made of
legislation, rules, and procedures, but also a “culture of care” within
a tax administration.199 Promoting a culture of care involves enforcing security, ethics, and proper handling and disposal of information.200 The desired outcome is that a taxpayer’s sensitive financial information is not accidentally or intentionally disclosed inappropriately and that the information is used only for the purposes
permitted under the exchange of information treaty or agreement.201
The OECD has created three model confidentiality provisions
for each exchange of information (EOI) instruments a country may
enter into with another country.202 The various EOIs that a country
may enter into with another may include tax treaties, tax information
exchange agreements (TIEAs), or multilateral instruments on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters.203 The three corresponding OECD models include: (1) the Model Tax Convention, (2)
the Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters
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(TIEA), and (3) the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.204 In pertinent part, Article 26(2) of
the OECD Model Tax Convention provides:
Any information received under paragraph 1 by a Contracting
State shall be treated as secret in the same manner as information
obtained under the domestic laws of that State and shall be disclosed
only to persons or authorities (including courts and administrative
bodies) concerned with the assessment or collection of, the enforcement or prosecution in respect of, the determination of appeals in
relation to the taxes referred to in paragraph 1, or the oversight of
the above. Such persons or authorities shall use the information only
for such purposes. They may disclose the information in public court
proceedings or in judicial decisions.205
Article 26(2) is relevant to data confidentiality because it states
that information received pursuant to a tax treaty shall be treated as
secret to the same extent as information obtained domestically
would in the recipient State.206 Additionally, Article 26(2) limits the
disclosure of information to the appropriate persons or authorities,
including the taxpayer, his proxy or witness, the courts, and administrative and oversight bodies.207 The information is disclosed only
to the persons or authorities necessarily involved in the assessment,
collection, enforcement, prosecution, or determination of appeals
with which the tax information is related.208
The confidentiality provisions under Article 8 of the Model
Agreement (TIEA) and Article 22 of the Multilateral Convention are
both similar to Article 26(2) of the Model Convention because they
require that the information be kept secret, restrict the entities that
can access the information, and limit the purposes for which the information can be used.209 The Model Agreement (TIEA) slightly
differs from the Model Tax Convention in that the TIEA does not
provide for keeping information secret in the same manner as the
recipient state would, and it “permits disclosure to any other person,
entity, authority or jurisdiction provided express written consent is
204
205
206
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208
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given by the competent authority of the requested party.”210 Like the
Model Agreement (TIEA), the Multilateral Convention also permits
the information to be used for other purposes as long as the requested party authorizes such use.211 The Multilateral Convention
differs from the other two because it specifically requires the recipient state to protect the personal data received in a manner consistent
with the data protection laws of the supplying State.212 Consequently, no matter which instrument negotiating countries may use
to establish the exchange of tax information, the OECD models set
a baseline for expectations regarding data confidentiality and protection.213
In addition to legal frameworks setting expectations for the protection of data exchanged internationally, the OECD’s report emphasizes the importance of tax confidentiality provisions in domestic legislation.214 The OECD’s guidance that domestic laws be implemented to protect and enforce the confidentiality of tax information and reflect the binding nature of treaty obligations supports
the proposition that the exchange of information as a solution to tax
evasion promotes better domestic governance.215 The OECD advises that domestic laws pertaining to data protection, privacy, and
the freedom of information are synchronized with, or provide exemptions for, exchange of information treaties or agreements.216
With respect to actual tax administration, policies and practices
should be comprehensive and address the following: employee
screening and background checks; employment contracts and employee training; accessibility to premises, and electronic and physical records; encryption and transferal; departure policies; information disposal policies; and managing unauthorized disclosures of
information and sanctions.217 Administrative policies and practices
“need to be reviewed and endorsed at the top level of tax administration,” and roles for implementing policy and procedure should be
210
211
212
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214
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clearly defined.218 Lastly, promoting a culture of care requires regularly monitoring compliance.219
It is important to note a criticism of the OECD models, particularly the Model Agreement. One contention is that the Model Agreement only covers the exchange of information upon request and not
the automatic or spontaneous exchange of information.220 For example, when information is requested, it must relate to a particular
inquiry regarding a known taxpayer.221 For instance, the BahamasU.S. TIEA requires a written request that specifically states the type
of information requested, the likely location of that information, the
relevant period of time, the applicable U.S. law, an indication of
whether the matter is criminal or civil, and reasons why the requested information is foreseeably relevant.222 Therefore, exchanging information upon request would require the requesting state to
at least know that the individual is evading taxes and to initiate its
own investigation.223 The chances of a state knowing whether an individual has evaded taxes in the first place is remote because of the
bank secrecy and data protection laws in other jurisdictions, including tax havens.224
On the other hand, the automatic exchange of information is
broader in scope and requires taxpayer information about various
categories of income to be spontaneously and periodically transmitted in bulk from the source country to the resident country.225 The
resident country need not put in any effort to ascertain non-compliant taxpayers beyond the infrastructure it has created for receiving
the exchanged information.226 Despite this criticism, the voluntary
218
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exchange of information, as opposed to automatic exchange, may
recognize the integrity of personal data and serve as a compromise
between two priorities: transparency in international tax and data
privacy. This may be because the exchange of information upon request still allows countries to go after tax evaders beyond its borders,
while the legal framework establishing the exchange prevents the
dragnet disclosure of personal financial information without a rational basis to tax administration.227 Personal financial information
will only be disclosed once the requesting state has done its due diligence.228
While the U.S. has not published guidance to a similar degree as
the OECD, it supports the automatic exchange of information
through FATCA.229 FATCA has been criticized by FFIs and foreign
jurisdictions that have argued complying with FATCA’s automatic
exchange scheme violates their domestic privacy and data protection
laws.230 Coupled with the withholding penalty for noncompliance,
some jurisdictions and FFIs feel that they must comply.231 Moreover, while IGAs between the U.S. Treasury Department and foreign
jurisdictions may provide a legal framework establishing the automatic exchange of information, IGAs, and treaties alike, require foreign jurisdictions to alter their own domestic laws to incorporate
terms of the agreement or treaty.232
Nevertheless, the U.S. does provide for the secure transmission
of automatically exchanged information with the IDES.233 The
IDES is an electronic, internet-based delivery point that FFIs and
Host Country Tax Authorities (HCTA) can use to directly transmit
data to the IRS.234 The sender must encrypt the data, and the IDES
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encrypts the transmission pathway.235 The IRS also provides information technology support known as Global IT Forum sessions to
provide updates and answers to technical questions.236
Ultimately, data protection and confidentiality is an important
aspect of information exchange and is itself a competing priority.237
The OECD model legal frameworks appear to offer jurisdictions
more flexibility with respect to determining the terms of their agreements or mutual administrative assistance.238 If a jurisdiction finds
that the appropriate safeguards are not in place in a partner jurisdiction or that there has been a breach in confidentiality, it may choose
to suspend the exchange agreement.239 While Argentina is committed to participating in the exchange of information under the CRS
and FATCA,240 its systemic corruption241 may be an obstacle in its
performance, which may cause other jurisdictions to question
whether appropriate data protection safeguards have been taken
within Argentina’s domestic tax administration. On the other hand,
participating in the global economy while committing to both transparency and the exchange of information may improve Argentina’s
governance and tax administration.242
C. Argentina’s Legal Capacity to Comply: Data Protection Law
in Argentina
In 2000, Argentina enacted the Personal Data Protection Act
(PDPA) Law No. 25,326 to regulate the usage of personal or sensitive data by public and private individuals as well as legal entities.243
The PDPA implements Argentina’s constitutional guarantees to data
privacy by guaranteeing an individual’s right to data privacy and
access to their data and creates a specific and affirmative cause of
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action for individuals to enforce their rights.244 In pertinent part, the
PDPA provides the following under Section 1:
The purpose of this Act is the full protection of personal information recorded in data files, registers,
banks or other technical means of data-treatment, either public or private for purposes of providing reports, in order to guarantee the honor and intimacy
of persons, as well as the access to the information
that may be recoded about such persons, in accordance with the provisions of Section 43, Third Paragraph of the National Constitution.245
Argentina refers to its affirmative cause of action as amparo,
which loosely means “shelter.”246 Amparo is a broad category of
several causes of action and is enshrined under article 43 of Argentina’s Constitution, amended in 1994.247
Not only does an amparo cause of action enable an individual to
obtain information about themselves held in public or private
sources, it “may be filed to request the suppression, rectification,
confidentiality or updating of said data.”248 A plaintiff may file an
amparo complaint in the case of false data or discrimination.249 Amparo is codified under Section 16 of the PDPA, which closely mirrors constitutional language.250 Section 16 provides for the additional affirmative right of “Habeas Data” and may be used when
“the person responsible for or the user of the data bank” is noncompliant with a plaintiff’s initial amparo complaint to rectify, update,
244
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suppress, or keep confidential their personal data.251 Amparo, as a
constitutional guarantee and category of cause of action, is not new
in Latin America.252 It exists in other Latin American countries as
well as civil law countries such as Spain and Portugal.253
Habeas Data, specifically, also exists in several Latin American
countries such as Brazil, Paraguay, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Peru
and is described as a procedural mechanism to “safeguard individual
freedom from abuse in the information age.”254 Several priorities
evident in the PDPA are (1) the consent, in most cases, of the individual about whom information or data is being collected, (2) notice,
notwithstanding whether consent is required, (3) the accuracy or
truthfulness of the data collected or used, and (4) the limitation of
data usage to the specific purpose for which it was collected.255 Accordingly, the PDPA declares “the rights of data subjects, the obligations of data controllers and data users, the supervisory authority
or controlling body, [and] sanctions and rules of procedure for the
‘habeas data’ judicial remedy.”256
In December 2001, Argentina issued regulations under Decree
No 1.558/2001, Regulations of Law No. 25,326, to implement the
PDPA.257 Additionally, the implementing regulations complete provisions of the PDPA and clarify provisions that may be ambiguous
or subject to interpretation.258 Together, Article 43.3 of the Argentinean Constitution, the PDPA, and Decree No. 1558/2001 form the
general legal framework of data protection law in Argentina.259
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With respect to enforcement, the Argentine Personal Data Protection Agency (APDPA) oversees the enforcement of the PDPA.260
Any public or private entity that uses data for non-personal uses
must register its database with the APDPA in order to lawfully keep
data.261 The APDPA may review complaints and affirmatively initiate investigations into PDPA violations.262 Moreover, the agency
has sanctions at its disposal to punish PDPA violators, such as civil
reprimands that may warn or suspend the violator’s use of such information, civil fines that range between $1,000 and $100,000, and
criminal sanctions.263 Individuals may face criminal sanctions, such
as imprisonment, for intentional acts like falsifying information or
data within a database or repository.264
While Argentina may have a sophisticated legal framework for
data protection modeled after Spain’s Law on the Protection of Personal Data,265 and in line with the rich history of amparo and habeas
data in Latin America, the country is amending its data protection
law to align more with Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR).266 The GDPR is a comprehensive data protection law enacted by the EU.267 The GDPR was enacted in 2016 and is far reaching because, once in force in 2018, it will effectively repeal and replace the data protection laws of individual EU member states.268
The goal of the GDPR is to harmonize data privacy laws across Europe, reshape the way data privacy is approached in the region, and

260

McCleary, supra note 243, at 143.
McCleary, supra note 243, at 144.
262
McCleary, supra note 243, at 143.
263
McCleary, supra note 243, at 144.
264
McCleary, supra note 243, at 144.
265
Eustice & Bohn, supra note 257, at 2.
266
Sarah Buerger, How the GDPR Changed the Argentina Personal Data
Protection
Act,
MICHALSONS
(Feb.
21,
2017),
https://www.michalsons.com/blog/argentina-personal-data-protection-act/25090.
267
General Data Protection Regulation- A Heads Up, MICHALSONS (Dec. 7,
2017),
https://www.michalsons.com/focus-areas/privacy-and-data-protection/general-data-protection-regulation-a-heads-up [hereinafter General Data
Protection Regulation]; accord John Giles, What is the GDPR and Why is it Important?, MICHALSONS (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.michalsons.com/blog/whatis-the-gdpr/18552.
268
EU GDPR Portal: Site Overview, https://www.eugdpr.org (last visited
Oct.10, 2018).
261

2019]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

159

lastly, protect the data privacy of all EU citizens.269 Because of the
vast spread of the EU, the GDPR is considered the most important
legislation on data protection in the world.270
Generally, the GDPR defines the roles of the three key actors
involved in the transfer of any data: the data subject, the controller,
and the processor.271 Data subjects include only natural persons, not
legal persons.272 Controllers are either natural or legal persons and
are the entities that determine the purposes and conditions for processing personal data.273 Lastly, the processor, a natural or legal person, is the entity, like an IT vendor, which processes the data on
behalf of the controller.274 Most of the GDPR applies to the obligations and conduct of controllers and the processors they use to lawfully process personal data.275
Argentina is aligning its PDPA with the GDPR because, although it is not an EU member state, Argentina does business with
the EU and is involved with EU member states through either tax
treaties, like Spain, or through Multilateral Competent Authority
Agreements (MCAA) to exchange financial account information
under the CRS.276 Therefore, aligning its PDPA with the GDPR may
benefit Argentina’s private, banking, and financial services sectors,
its domestic tax administration, and its ability to perform under its
exchange of information agreements with respect to tax matters.
There are areas where the PDPA diverges from the GDPR.277
For example, the PDPA defines data subjects differently, and it includes both natural and legal persons, whereas the GDPR only includes natural persons.278 Additionally, other areas that differ from
269
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the GDPR were determined in 2002 by the EU’s Article 29 Working
Party.279 The Working Party was established under Article 29 of the
EU’s European Commission Directive 95/46/EC, and it is an independent advisory body on data protection and privacy.280 The Working Party found several concerns with Argentina’s PDPA: (1) the
PDPA inadequately protects the personal data and financial information of data subjects in cross-border transfers, (2) too many exceptions exist to prohibitions on transferring personal data to jurisdictions lacking appropriate levels of data protection, and (3) the
National Directorate for Personal Data Protection (NDPDP) lacks
sufficient independence from other entities within the Argentine
government.281 However, despite the few weaknesses found in the
PDPA, the Working Party found that Argentina ensures an adequate
level of data protection within the meaning of Article 25(6) of the
European Commission’s 1995 Directive on data protection.282
V. CONCLUSION: THE CONFLUENCE OF CORRUPTION,
GOVERNANCE, AND THE WILLINGNESS TO
CHANGE
The provisions for data protection within Argentina’s constitution, statute, and regulations provide an adequate legal framework
for the protection of data according to the EU’s Article 29 Working
Party.283 Also, the PDPA is similar in many respects to the EU’s
GDPR, a colossal legal framework for data protection covering
twenty-eight member states.284 It may be reasonable to say that Argentina’s legal framework is sophisticated based on EU standards
and taking into account the overall tradition of habeas data and amparo in Latin America.285 Although there are a few weaknesses in
the PDPA, it sufficiently provides Argentina with the statutory and
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procedural means to keep exchanged tax information safe in accordance with the OECD’s Keeping It Safe report.286 This is because unlike other developing countries that may not possess the technological or bureaucratic infrastructure for such enhanced tax administration and administration in general, Argentina does.
However, while Argentina possesses the legal frameworks “on
paper,” it remains to be seen whether it can execute its commitments
under FATCA or the CRS or whether other countries with which
Argentina has agreements or treaties trust in Argentina’s ability to
safeguard the personal tax and financial information it exchanges.
Argentina’s historical and current problems with systemic corruption, from grand to petty, in its institutions at the political and bureaucratic level287 are serious impediments to meeting its commitments.
Moreover, as long as economic gains are consistently eroded by
inflation, and barriers to competition and income inequality remain
high, Argentines will continue to flock to the informal market to
substitute their pesos for dollars, which wealthier Argentines would
prefer to safeguard in foreign offshore accounts.288 Notwithstanding
domestic policy, such as the ley de blanqueos offering amnesty to
tax evaders,289 international introspection into Argentina’s tax administration shows that there are holes, which may promote bribery.290 As the 2017 OECD Working Group on Bribery found, Argentina is still noncompliant, and most relevant to its tax administration, it is implementing recommendations, training tax administrators on detecting bribery, and amending its legislation to share tax
information with foreign authorities for use in bribery investigations.291
Also pertinent, there are repeated calls for Argentina to
strengthen the independence of government entities that investigate
286
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corruption.292 In order for Argentina to create the culture of care293
necessary to protect data, it will need to ensure that policies and procedures for handling, transferring, and even disposing of information are endorsed at the top level of tax administration and regularly monitored for compliance.294 If Argentina cannot squarely
tackle its problems with corruption, it may threaten the integrity of
the new PDPA that the Argentine legislature is developing, and it
may have a negative effect on Argentina’s international business
dealings and exchange of information agreements or treaties with
respect to protecting personal tax information.
Argentina’s willingness to change, under the current Macri Administration, is likely a good indicator that Argentina will honor its
commitment to the U.S. under FATCA and to the respective countries with which it has entered into multilateral agreements with under CRS. This is because Macri has worked with the Argentine legislature to implement pro-market and fiscally conservative reforms.295 These reforms have focused on addressing rampant inflation, the black market for pesos and the informal economy, tax evasion, and government fraud with respect to pension programs.296 It
appears that much of the domestic legal and political change Argentina is experiencing is heavily influenced by external, international
changes, such as the move toward more tax transparency and less
bank secrecy. Additionally, Argentina’s desire to have access to international finance and markets likely compels it to agree with the
international consensus that bank secrecy destabilizes297 the international economy. The importance of protecting and keeping confidential personal tax and financial data compliments the international
move toward transparency and the exchange of information.
While Argentina has made commitments on different fronts pertaining to data protection, the exchange of tax information, and reducing corruption, there has not been a synchronized effort. The
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OECD’s Keeping It Safe report recommends synchronizing domestic laws pertaining to data protection with exchange of information
treaties or agreements.298
Despite the current status of Argentina’s efforts, it should have
less difficulty complying with FATCA than CRS because of
FATCA’s unilateral299 nature. FATCA generally is not concerned
with exchanging data of foreign nationals residing in the U.S., but
rather, FATCA is concerned with receiving the financial data of
U.S. citizens and residents under U.S. jurisdiction for tax purposes.300 Moreover, the IDES system streamlines the data transmission process and encrypts the data for FFIs and Host Country Tax
Authorities (HCTA).301 On the other hand, Argentina may have
more difficulty complying with its agreements under CRS because
of the sheer number of countries it may be dealing with that may
have different data protection standards. Additionally, Argentina’s
current data protection framework may not meet the standards of
certain EU member states, necessitating Argentina to alter its domestic law.302 Nevertheless, the future may be very bright for Argentina because its efforts to keep up with the global movement for
tax transparency and the exchange of tax information will likely improve domestic governance and the integrity of Argentine institutions.
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